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“POLITICAL” SCIENCE:
REGULATORY SCIENCE AFTER
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO*

On April 23, 2008, the Union of Concerned Scientists, a public
interest organization in Washington, D.C., released a survey it had
conducted of scientists who worked for the Environmental Protection
1
Agency (EPA). The survey found that almost 900 of the 1,600
scientists who worked for the EPA had experienced political
2
interference in their work over the last five years. Scientists at three
other agencies also reported to the Union of Concerned Scientists
similar interference. The other agencies were the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA),3 which regulates the safety of pharmaceutical
drugs and food, the Fish and Wildlife Service,4 which protects wild
animals and their habitats, and the National Oceanic and
5
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which, among other duties,
studies climate change.
* University Distingished Professor of Law, Wake Forest University.
1. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, VOICES OF EPA SCIENTISTS: HUMAN HEALTH
AND THE ENVIRONMENT DEPEND ON INDEPENDENT SCIENCE (2008), available at
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/epa-survey-brochure.pdf; UNION OF
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SURVEY: EPA SCIENTISTS (2007): HUMAN HEALTH AND THE
ENVIRONMENT DEPEND ON INDEPENDENT SCIENCE (2008), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/
scientific_integrity/abuses_of_science/survey-of-epa-scientists.html.
2. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, VOICES OF EPA SCIENTISTS: HUMAN HEALTH
AND THE ENVIRONMENT DEPEND ON INDEPENDENT SCIENCE (2008), available at
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/epa-survey-brochure.pdf.
3. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, VOICES OF SCIENTISTS AT FDA: PROTECTING
PUBLIC HEALTH DEPENDS ON INDEPENDENT SCIENCE (2008), available at
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/fda-survey-brochure.pdf.
4. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICES SURVEY
SUMMARY (2005), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/
fws_survey_summary_1.pdf; see also UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SURVEY: U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERVICE SCIENTISTS (2005) (2005), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/
scientific_integrity/abuses_of_science/us-fish-wildlife-service.html
5. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SURVEY OF NOAA FISHERIES SERVICE
EMPLOYEES (2005), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/
NOAA_Fisheries_Full_Survey_Results_1.pdf; see also UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
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One of the primary ways that the Bush Administration has
interfered with agency science has been to change scientific results or
to repress them. Perhaps the most notorious example involves Philip
Cooney, who was chief of staff of the White House Council on
6
Environmental Quality until 2005. Prior to becoming a government
official, he worked for various oil companies.7 Cooney edited scientific
reports to overemphasize the scientific uncertainty of a human role in
global climate change and to deemphasize the scientific evidence in
support of such a role.8 Similarly, scientists at the FDA and the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service report that they were asked to change
information or alter conclusions in scientific reports for non-scientific
reasons.9 In other instances, administration officials have attempted to
suppress inconvenient scientific information by refusing to permit
agency scientists to publish scientific papers or to make presentations
at scientific meetings.10
The Administration has also engaged in science denial. The most
obvious example is its refusal to acknowledge or to act on the
overwhelming scientific evidence of global climate change,11 but this is
not the only instance of such activity. The FDA, for example, refused
to approve Plan B, an emergency contraceptive, despite the fact that
two scientific advisory committees had overwhelmingly found that the
12
drug was safe and effective. In light of the advisory committees’
SUMMARY OF NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION FISHERIES SERVICE
SCIENTIST
SURVEY
(2005),
available
at
http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/
abuses_of_science/survey-noaa-fisheries.html.
6. SETH SHULMAN, UNDERMINING SCIENCE: SUPPRESSION AND DISTORTION IN THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION, 18–21 (2006).
7. Id.
8. Id.; Carl Hulse, National Briefing Washington: Senators Seek Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES,
June
30,
2005,
available
at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9C04E5DB133AF933A05755C0A9639C8B63&scp=1&sq=National%20Briefing%20Washingto
n:%20Senators%20Seek%20Inquiry&st=cse.
9. A survey of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) scientists by the Union of
Concerned Sciences found that nearly one-fifth of the 997 scientists who responded to the study
said that they “have been asked, for non-scientific reasons, to inappropriately exclude or alter
technical information or their conclusions in a FDA scientific document.” VOICES OF FDA
SCIENTISTS, supra note 3. A joint survey conducted by the Union of Concerned Scientists and
the Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility found that close to one-fifth of the
respondents at the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service reported that they had been instructed
inappropriately to exclude or alter technical information from a scientific document.
SHULMAN, supra note 6, at 83; see also sources cited supra notes 3–5.
10. SHULMAN, supra note 6, at 83.
11. Id. at 16–30.
12. Id. at 46–49.
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recommendations, the FDA’s weak efforts to justify the outcome
strongly suggest that the Bush Administration was supporting the
13
reproductive agenda of its religious supporters.
These attacks on the integrity of science have not gone
unnoticed.14 According to one author, “[t]he degree of lying,
deception, and manipulation of information reported across so many
federal agencies would seem to have required in the administration of
George W. Bush a combination of callousness, mendacity, and hubris
that is rare even in the messy history of American politics.”15 Members
of the American scientific community have also responded. In 2006,
more than 10,000 scientists—including 52 Nobel Laureates—signed a
statement that denounces political interference with science in
16
government and calls for reform.
Here, I want to analyze how the administrative process is used in
the United States to minimize political interference of this type. I will
describe the institutional arrangements that are used to reduce the
influence of politics in regulatory decision-making, and I will assess
the accomplishments of some of these arrangements. I will then
return to the politicization of regulatory science in the Bush
Administration and discuss some lessons that we have learned in this
area over the past eight years.
I. THE PROGRESSIVES AND SCIENCE
The origin of the modern administrative agency dates back to the
1880s and reflects the influence of the Progressives.17 It was the

13. Id. at 49–56.
14. For an overview of the politicization of science in the Bush Administration,
see SHULMAN, supra note 6; CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE (2005);
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY IN POLICYMAKING: AN
INVESTIGATION INTO THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S MISUSE OF SCIENCE (2004), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/ucsintegrity.pdf; SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION,
MINORITY STAFF OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, POLITICS AND SCIENCE IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION: PREPARED FOR
REP. HENRY A. WAXMAN (Aug. 2003), available at http://oversight.house.gov/features/
politics_and_science/pdfs/pdf_politics_and_science_rep.pdf.
15. SHULMAN, supra note 6, at xv.
16. Press Release, Union of Concerned Scientists, 10,600 Scientists Condemn Political
Interference in Science (Dec. 11, 2006), http://www.ucsusa.org/news/press_release/10600scientists-condemn.html.
17. MORDECAI LEE, BUREAUS OF EFFICIENCY: REFORMING LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN
THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 15–17 (Thomas J. Jablonsky, ed., 2008).
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Progressives who introduced the idea that regulatory decisions should
18
be made by persons with scientific and professional training.
The Progressives objected to the business monopolies,
unscrupulous corporations, and corrupt politicians that were
19
prominent in the United States during the 1880s. As a solution to the
problems these institutions posed, the Progressives supported
establishing government agencies to regulate corporations and
monopolies, but they were also concerned that the political corruption
prevalent at the time would spread to these new agencies.20 They
therefore supported a civil service system of hiring and promoting
government employees based on their qualifications and job
performance instead of their political patronage.21 More generally, the
Progressive political movement supported expertise as a solution to
political corruption.22
The Progressives’ faith in expertise was influenced by the
development of scientific rationalism that was occurring in the United
23
States at the time. Scientific rationalism proposed that human and
organizational behavior was the product of relationships that could be
24
rationally deduced and described by empirical and objective inquiry.
The Progressives therefore understood science to be a non-political
and impartial methodology that would insulate government from an
undesirable political environment.25
The idea that expertise is a way of reducing political interference
in the administrative process remains a foundational idea today, but it
is also clear that the Progressives were mistaken in their idea that a
professionalized bureaucracy was sufficient in and of itself to ensure
good and accountable government. One reason this idea is mistaken
is that the administrators who run regulatory agencies may not follow
the advice that scientists give them. The other reason is that science

18. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch:
Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions,
1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 392–93 (1987).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.; LEE, supra note 17, at 16.
22. LEE, supra note 17, at 16.
23. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 18, at 393.
24. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC
NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 5–12 (1973).
25. LEE, supra note 17, at 15–17.
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cannot provide definitive answers to important questions that
agencies must resolve in order to regulate.
A. Administrators Who Ignore Expertise
The political appointee in charge of an agency may choose not to
follow the advice of the professionals working for the agency because
following that advice conflicts with some personal motive, such as
advancing his or her career by pleasing a political constituency of the
President. Public choice theory, the dominant explanation of
governmental behavior in political science and economics, explicitly
predicts such outcomes.26 This approach describes administrators as
private individuals who seek to maximize their own utility, rather than
as government officials primarily concerned with the public interest.27
Just as businessmen seek to maximize their profit, public officials act
to accumulate power, prestige, or other advantages that are in their
self-interest. The administrator will therefore supply regulatory
outcomes that favor the interest groups in the best position to support
the person’s ambitions.28 These are often the very business firms that
the agency is supposed to regulate, a result often described as “agency
capture,” because such firms find it more profitable to organize
politically to support their self-interest than do members of the public
or the groups that represent the public.29
As I will develop, the public choice description of administration
is incomplete and sometimes misleading. But these qualifications do
not mean that agencies will not be captured in the manner that the
theory predicts. Jeffrey Holmstead, who was appointed by President
George W. Bush to head the EPA’s Office of Air and Radiation, is a

26. Sidney A. Shapiro, Symposium: Keeping the Baby and Throwing Out the Bathwater:
Justice Breyer’s Critique of Regulation, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 721, 722 (1995) (“The sellers [of
regulation] are public officials who make regulatory decisions according to their own selfinterest.”).
27. Id. (citing DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE:
A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 22 (1991); ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 44 (1967))
(“Legislators respond to buyers who offer support for reelection, while agency officials respond
to buyers who can assist them to obtain additional power and prestige.”).
28. ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF GOVERNMENT 27–28 (1957).
29. Shapiro, supra note 26, at 723 (citing MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 43–52 (1971)) (“When a regulatory
decision benefits the members of such a group at the expense of thousands of citizens, the
members of the industry or producer group have an economic incentive to engage in collective
political action.”).
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good example. Holmstead came to the EPA from the law firm of
Latham & Watkins where, among other clients, he represented the
Alliance for Constructive Air Policy, an electric utility trade group
whose goal is to weaken the Clean Air Act. As reported in the St.
Louis Post-Dispatch, Holmstead “helped craft new standards for
mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants. As the rules were
being written, career EPA staff members were told by Mr. Holmstead
. . . not to carry out the usual scientific and economic reviews.”30
Worse, perhaps, “[k]ey passages in the new standards were copied
word-for-word from memos prepared by the Washington lobbying
[law] firm of Latham & Watkins,” where, of course, Holmstead had
worked before his appointment.31 Holmstead also testified before
Congress that EPA officials did not believe that proposed changes to
a set of regulations called New Source Review32 “could seriously
undermine the E.P.A.’s lawsuits against . . . violators” of the Clean Air
Act, when his staff in fact had warned him that the changes would
have this effect.33
I understand that claims an administrator has favored regulated
entities for personal, rather than policy, reasons may be in the eye of
the beholder. What appears to be unreasonable to an environmental
organization may be a sensible policy in the eyes of the chemical
industry. Nevertheless, when an administrator ignores scientific
evidence, or seeks to alter such evidence, in order to reach a decision
favorable to a regulated entity, it is a reasonable inference that the
administrator is acting in the manner public choice theory predicts. As
the polling data from the Union of Concerned Scientists indicates, this
34
form of capture was routine in the Bush Administration.

30. Editorial, An Unsuitable Appointment at the EPA, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
May 1, 2006, at D8, available at 2006 WLNR 7446629.
31. Id.
32. New Source Review (NSR) is a part of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments and
requires permits for the construction of any new or modified pollution-emitting structure in
order to make sure that such structure will not reduce air quality beyond certain limits.
For more information, see http://www.epa.gov/NSR/.
33. Bruce Barcott, Changing All the Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2004, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CE3D61E30F937A35757C0A9629C8B63&s
cp=1&sq=changing%20all%20the%20rules&st=cse.
34. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra notes 1, 3–5.
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B. Science Has Its Limits
Science can inform regulatory decision-making in useful ways,
which is why scientists have been so concerned with the anti-science
actions of the Bush Administration. Nevertheless, many regulatory
issues are “trans-scientific,” which means that, although they can be
stated as scientific questions, they are not capable of being resolved
because of the state of scientific knowledge or because of the lack of
accessible scientific data.
The assessment of risks posed by dangerous chemicals offers a
good illustration of this limitation. In the environmental statutes,
Congress has established a “risk trigger” that indicates when a risk is
35
significant enough that it requires regulation. The burden of proof
for meeting the requirements of a risk trigger is stated in different
ways in different statutes.36 A typical formulation is that Congress
37
requires an agency to regulate on the basis of anticipated harm. The
EPA, for example, is required under the Clean Air Act to regulate
sources of pollution that may cause or contribute to “air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare.”38
In making determinations about a risk trigger, agencies seldom
have conclusive evidence about the risks posed by chemicals. As the
National Academy of Sciences has explained, “[D]ata may be
incomplete, and there is often great uncertainty in estimates of the
types, probability, and magnitude of health effects associated with a
chemical agent . . . and of the extent of current and possible future
39
human exposures. These problems have no immediate solutions. . . .”
The lack of definitive scientific evidence does not mean that
regulation is inappropriate. As noted, Congress has required agencies
to regulate on the basis of potential risk to humans, rather than
40
waiting for definitive evidence that a substance is harmful.

35. See SIDNEY SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK:
RESTORING PRAGMATIC APPROACH 33–35 (2003) (discussing Congress’ decision to include risk
triggers in environmental statutes).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (West 2008).
39. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 11 (1983).
40. SHAPIRO & GLICKMAN, supra note 35.
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In order to determine whether incomplete scientific information is
sufficient to meet the requirements of a risk trigger, agencies employ
certain assumptions to overcome problems in the lack of data. These
methodologies reflect scientific knowledge, but they are not the
product purely of scientific expertise; they also reflect policy
preferences. For example, agencies typically assume in the absence of
evidence to the contrary that a carcinogen has no threshold
concentration below which the substance poses no risk of causing
cancer.41 While this assumption is based on general scientific
knowledge about cancer, agencies employ it because it is consistent
42
with a statutory mandate to act on the basis of anticipated harm. The
assumption serves a precautionary purpose because it errs on the side
of overestimating the extent of harm, rather than underestimating it.
The trans-scientific nature of many regulatory issues does not
mean that science is not useful in resolving many such issues, although
the degree of assistance will vary. Scientific knowledge and evidence
point the agency in the direction it needs to go. But science will offer
an agency operating on the frontiers of science less direction than it
would if more were known.
II. ENTER THE LAWYERS
Decisions about risks require science, but we do not rely only on
scientific expertise to ensure the accountability of regulatory agencies.
Administrators may ignore the science, and in any cases, science
cannot provide definitive answers to important questions that
agencies must resolve in order to regulate. Since 1946, the country has
relied on the legal procedures mandated by the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)43 to offer another layer of protection against
the misuse of administrative power.
Legal procedures work to ensure an agency’s compliance with its
statutory mandate by reinforcing the role of scientific expertise. The
courts review agency decisions on the basis of the rulemaking record

41. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 39, at 54–55 (describing the
method by which Congress and agencies have historically determined the danger of
carcinogens).
42. Id.
43. Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551–559, 701–706, 1305,
3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (West 2007)).
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44
compiled by an agency. These records are a compilation of the
scientific, economic, and other types of evidence relevant to the
agency’s regulatory decision. In order to comply with the APA, the
courts expect agencies to have sufficient evidence to support the
rationality of a policy decision.45 Agencies cannot merely assert that
an outcome is consistent with a statutory mission; they must support
46
this assertion with data and expert opinion. In determining whether
the evidence is sufficient, judges also consider contradictory evidence
offered by regulated entities and their beneficiaries.47 More broadly,
legal procedures work to ensure an agency’s compliance with its
statutory mandate by reviewing its policy decisions and determining
whether they are consistent with those intended by Congress.
I noted earlier that public choice theory is incomplete and
sometimes misleading. One reason, as Professor Stephen Crowley has
stated, is that it fails to credit administrative procedures for deterring
self-serving decisions by administrators.48 Crowley documents a
number of regulatory decisions that adopt regulations over the
objections of regulated entities, which contradicts the public choice
prediction that agencies are doomed to be captured by the entities
that they regulate.49 As Crowley notes, however, legal procedures do
not guarantee that agencies are never captured.50 For example, the
courts may have difficulty determining if an agency is acting
consistently with its statutory mission when Congress states that
mission in vague and general terms.51 The courts also have difficulty
policing the lack of action by an agency, which can result from

44. See, e.g., Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743–44 (1985) (“The task of
the reviewing court is to [judge] the agency decision based on the record the agency presents to
the reviewing court.”).
45. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 103 (1983) (“[An] agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made.’” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168
(1962))).
46. Id.
47. Shoreham Coop. Apple Producers Ass’n v. Donovan, 764 F.2d 135, 140–41
(2d Cir. 1985) (“[T]he agency is obligated to examine the available evidence and . . . should take
account of evidence placed before the agency by interested parties . . . .”).
48. STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS 258–83 (2008).
49. Id. at 249–57.
50. Id. at 248.
51. Id. at 99–101.
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52
political pressure by regulated entities opposing regulation. This has
particularly been a problem in the Bush Administration, which has
been a reluctant regulator to say the least. When such gaps exist, there
is room for the politicization of science to occur.
Ultimately, reliance on the courts to ensure accountability runs
into an intractable difficulty. The federal judiciary is not elected;
judges are appointed. Moreover, once appointed, they have life-time
tenure. This combination creates the potential for unelected judges
with lifetime tenure to substitute their ideas about regulatory policy
for the solutions preferred by regulatory agencies. Indeed, there is
persuasive empirical evidence that this has occurred. A number of
studies correlate the outcome of a case with whether a judge has been
appointed by a Republican or Democratic president, which is used as
53
a proxy for ideology. The results demonstrate that a judge’s ideology
is a reliable predictor of the outcome of a case.54 For example,
Professor Revesz has found that challengers seeking more stringent
health-and-safety regulations prevailed in 50.3 percent of cases
involving at least two judges appointed by Democratic presidents, but
in only 27.8 percent of cases before panels in which at least two of the
judges were appointed by Republican presidents.55 Other studies have

52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2169
(1998) (finding panels in the D.C. Circuit controlled by judges appointed by Republican
presidents issued conservative decisions in 54% of cases in which the Chevron doctrine was
applied, whereas panels controlled by judges appointed by Democratic presidents judges
rendered liberal decisions in 68% of Chevron cases); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or
Politics?, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 1741, 1759–60 (1999) (finding that courts denied standing to
environmental plaintiffs in 29% of cases, but “Republican judges voted to deny standing to
environmental plaintiffs in 43.5% of cases, while Democratic judges voted to deny standing to
environmental plaintiffs in only 11.1% of cases,” and finding that Republican judges on the D.C.
Circuit denied standing in 79.2% of the cases, while Democratic judges on the D.C. Circuit did
so in only 18.2% of the cases); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the
D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1763 (1997) (finding that panels in the D.C. Circuit
dominated by judges appointed by Republican presidents found fatal flaws in the reasoning the
EPA used to support rules in up to 89% of cases, while panels dominated by judges appointed
by Democratic presidents found such flaws in no more than 13% of cases); Cass R. Sunstein,
David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A
Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 318, 322–23 (2004) (finding that judges appointed
by Republican presidents voted against industry challenges to EPA rules in 46% of cases, and
judges appointed by Democratic presidents voted against such challenges in 64% of cases).
54. See sources cited supra note 53.
55. Richard L. Revesz, Congressional Influence on Judicial Behavior? An Empirical
Examination of Challenges to Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100, 1104
(2001).
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56
found similar results. This may weaken agency accountability for the
misuse of science.

III. REDUCING POLITICIZATION OF SCIENCE
To sum up, the regulatory system is based on the two underlying
concepts of controlling agency discretion. First, to some extent, it
trusts in scientific expertise. We expect that agencies will use their
expert judgment, and to the extent that this happens, courts will defer
to that judgment. At the same time, we do not entirely trust in agency
expertise. Courts review regulations in recognition that agencies may
ignore the science and, in any case, regulatory decisions are not purely
based on science.
With this background in mind, we can return to the actions of the
Bush Administration and understand why they are so troubling. First,
members of the administration have sought to change or alter
57
scientific results. This effort is an attack on the integrity of a
fundamental protection against the misuse of regulatory power. One
of the ways that the courts identify corruptive political interference is
to ask whether the agency’s decision makes sense in light of the
evidence in the rulemaking record.58 If agency officials change that
evidence to accord with their political preferences, this safeguard will
not work.
Second, members of the Bush Administration have engaged in
science denial. As mentioned earlier, the administration’s refusal to
act regarding global climate change is probably the best example of
59
this head-in-the-sand attitude. The judicial system, however, is not
very good at policing the lack of action. In this manner, the
administration’s disregard of science may delay necessary regulation
by years.
As we move forward, what, if anything, can be done to discourage
the politicization of science? The best thing, of course, is for political
officials to respect and take into serious consideration what science

56. See sources cited supra note 53.
57. SHULMAN, supra note 6, at 18–24, 31–32, 82–83.
58. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (holding that there is a presumption against changes in regulatory policy
not justified by the rulemaking record).
59. SHULMAN, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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has to teach us. Whether such consideration can be mandated, or at
least encouraged, by the use of administrative procedures is a pressing
and difficult issue.
I have two proposals. When Congress created the Occupational
Safety & Health Administration (OSHA), it created a science agency
to assist OSHA, the National Institute of Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH). Congress, however, located NIOSH not in the
Department of Labor, where OSHA is located, but in the Department
of Health and Human Services because it wanted to protect the
scientific advice issued by NIOSH from political influence. This
solution has one important difficulty: it creates coordination
problems. Scientists in an independent agency will not necessarily
work according to an agency’s priorities.60
There may be another way to protect the integrity of scientific
advice. Congress could require that an agency publish scientific
documents without edits or alterations by agency officials. Currently,
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), there is an exemption
for “inter-agency memorandums . . . which would not be available by
61
law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.”
The legislative history makes it clear that the exemption was intended
to incorporate the government’s common law privilege from
discovery in litigation.62 According to the Supreme Court, this
privilege includes “executive privilege material” or pre-decisional
documents.63 The reason for the privilege, as you would suppose, is to
protect open and frank advice and recommendations from
government employees to their superiors.
Under the FOIA exemption, scientific advice and reports from
agency staff to agency officials are generally not available to the
public because they fall within the ambit of pre-decisional
64
documents. This secrecy, however, facilitates interference with

60. THOMAS O. MCGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED
PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 39–40 (1993).
61. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(5) (West 2007).
62. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2427–28.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974) (discussing executive
privilege in the context of communications with the President).
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(9th Cir. 1988) (holding that agency information is exempted from FOIA if it is both predecisional and deliberative); Petroleum Info. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1435
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science. Under a veil of secrecy, agency officials have greater leeway
to change scientific documents or to ignore them. I would therefore
urge Congress to consider eliminating the FOIA exception as it
applies to certain categories of scientific documents and to require
instead that such documents be made public as they are finished and
before they are submitted to the political officials of the agency.
The argument against this proposal, of course, is that it will
prevent agency officials from receiving the fullest and most candid
advice. I do not think this objection has much force in this situation,
however. The advice being received is about the state of the science
and not about what action the agency should take based on the
science. Thus, although the information is relevant to the agency’s
decision, it is not advice and recommendations concerning a
regulatory decision, so it does not fall within the full ambit of a predecisional document.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Administration of George W. Bush was no friend of
regulatory science. Agency administrators changed, repressed, or
ignored significant science information that did not coincide with the
Administration’s ideological preferences. While science seldom
indicates what regulatory outcome is best, it is often essential to
making informed regulatory decisions. The perversion of science that
occurred in the Bush Administration is therefore important to
understand and to counter.
Giving scientists an independent voice may be an effective way of
countering interference with science. This can be done by requiring
agencies to publish science documents without edits or alterations by
political officials. There may be other useful remedies as well. In light
of the “political” science practiced by the Bush Administration,
devising appropriate responses deserves our attention.

(D.C. Cir. 1992) (“To fall within the deliberative process privilege, materials must bear on the
formulation or exercise of agency policy-oriented judgment.”).

